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COMMENT ON PROFESSOR CARRINGTON'S ARTICLE 
''THE INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO." 
ROY A. SCHOTLANO* 
Paul Carrington's paper requires what administrative law people call 
"'hard look' review" for two reasons: 
First: In his view, life tenure for judges "is a genuinely bad idea," so 
outlandish it has been copied only once, by "the constitution of Western 
Samoa."· 
In my view, whether or not Article m2 is written as members of a new 
constitutional convention might write it, there is nothing more fundamental to 
the way our entire judicial system operates (including in many ways, although 
indirectly, our state courts) than federal judges being as independent as law 
can make them. Perhaps I suffer from Burkean skepticism about reform of 
long-standing institutions, or perhaps I am merely a supporter of the status quo. 
But I believe that, despite obvious drawbacks in giving anyone life tenure in 
any job, we gain far more than we lose by making federal judges independent, 
i.e., so protected from external pressures and internal incentives. Article m's 
grant of life tenure is the bedrock of our Constitution's guarantees (and 
therefore our Rule of Law and our protection of minorities arid dissenters) and 
assurances that lasting values are not eroded by ephemeral passions.3 
Copyright @ 2002, Roy A. Schotland 
·Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. 
I PaulO. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence. and Democratic 
Accountability o/the Supreme Court o/Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, at 467 (forthcoming 
2002). Since the aspect of life tenure that concerns Carrington isn't senility but is 
unaccountability, he ought not ignore New York State's fourteen year tenns, let alone the 
service to age 70 in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and the House of Lords (and for the Lord 
Chancellor, service to age 75). Perhaps even worse is his not considering how much 
"accountability" exists in the career judiciaries in Europe, Japan, etc. 
2 U.S. CONST. art. III . 
. 3 ''There are particular moments in public affairs when the people ... are misled by 
the artful misrepresentation of interested men .... What bitter anguish would not the people of 
Athens have often escaped if their government had contained as provident a safeguard against 
the tyranny of their own passions. Popular liberty might have escaped the indelible reproach of 
decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next." THE 
FEOERAUST No. 63 (James Madison). 
''The republican principle ... does not require unqualified compliance with every sudden 
breeze of passion for every transient impulse that the people may receive from the arts of men 
who flatter their prejudices to betray their interest." THE FEDERAUST No. 71 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
489 
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Given the mountain of thoughtful writing about counter-majoritarianism, I 
will not even try to add to that commentary. There is no proving that life 
tenure is, on balance, desirable because like everything else in life, it has 
strengths and weaknesses, and different people may bring out the balance at 
different points. But when an attack on Article ill comes with provable errors, 
noting those errors raises a caveat about the attack. I believe that life tenure is 
so uniquely important, that no error-ridden attack on it can enjoy a free pass. 
Second: Carrington attacks the integrity of elective judges.4 He says that 
"what we have in high court elections is interest group politics in its most 
unwelcome fonns;" that such groups "try to buy a high court," to gain "control 
over the court," noting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce "candidates 
prevailed in ten of the twelve supreme court races it targeted."s Ohioans know 
that the Chamber's effort against Justice Alice Resnick backfired, helping her 
to a 57% win. (What a shame that the able judge who challenged the able 
Justice is tarred by some of what was done on his behalf.) Two other Chamber 
candidates also suffered the Chamber's back-firing support. The Chamber's 
ads for Mississippi's Chief Justice enabled her opponent to win 52%-48% by 
attacking her outside support. (That justice had served for 15 years and her 
challenger had raised only $9,000 as of mid-October). In addition, the 
Chamber's ads defeated another candidate running with her.6 Carrington buys 
the Chamber's inflated count and its self-congratulation, but its other 
candidates would have won without it.' For example, the three Michigan 
incumbent Justices who were re-elected in landslides were not bought and are 
not controlled by the Chamber. 
Carrington uses the kind of hyperbole that I call into question in an 
analysis of the myth of distortion and of a study slandering the Ohio Justices. 8 
For him to disclaim any accusation that some campaign participants and the 
judges they support are involved in bribery does not free him from the 
responsibility to be careful. 
4 Carrington & Long. supra note 1. 
sid. at 473-74. 479. 
6 In September 200 1. we learned for the first time not only some major sources of the 
Chamber's judicial campaign funds for 2000. but also the internal disagreement about that 
effort. Jim VandeHei. Political Cover: Major Business Lobby Wins Back Its Clout by 
Dispensing Favors. W Au.. STREET J .• Sept. 11. 200 I. at A 1. General Motors. a major supporter 
of other Chamber political efforts. refused to help the judicial campaign effort. Id. 
Contributors of $1 million each included Wal-Mart. DaimlerChrysler. Home Depot. and the 
American Council of Life Insurers. Id. Efforts by leading corporate general counsels are now 
under way to avoid repetition of the Chamber's advertising in 2000. 
7 Roy A. Schotland. Financing Judicial Elections. 2000: Change and Challenge. L. 
REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849 (2001). 
8 Roy A. Schotland. Personal Views. 34 LoY. L.A. L.REv. 1361. 1364-65 (2001). 
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Some readers may see little significance in the errors that Carrington 
makes, but I repeat: I submit this comment only because of the need for serious 
pause in considering what he writes here-- apart from his fascinating account 
of Frederick Grimke and the 19th century Bamburners.9 
The errors are set forth not in order of importance, but in the order they 
appear: 
Page 472: ''The breakout event [in greater interest in selecting members of 
state supreme courts] occurred in California in the 1970s when voters reacted 
strongly against a series of decisions of their state supreme court. "10 What 
occurred in the 1970s was a 1978 effort by the deputy district attorneys of Los 
Angeles County to challenge local incumbent trial judges. The successful 
campaign in 1986 to deny retention to Chief Justice Rose Bird and her 
colleagues Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso was fueled entirely by only a 
single series of decisions: Bird's unyielding refusal to uphold any death 
sentence. Also, the implication that that event was driven by interest groups 
able to "buy" judicial seats is refuted by the facts about the sources of funds in 
that campaign.ll 
Carrington also attacks the California, New Jersey, and Ohio high courts 
for "[f]ollowing the Warren Court [into making] dramatic, high visibility 
decisions," which brought on the contests to "buy" "control" of such courts. 12 
The attack is hit-and-run, lacking explanation of the kinds of decisions he has 
in mind. In Carrington's last foray against judicial independence, he 
emphasized one example: courts' decisions that state constitutions require 
changing school finance from an exclusively property-tax basis. His attack and 
my response-which include noting that there is much to be said for such 
decisions and that fourteen state courts have agreed with California and New 
Jersey (since that time, add Ohio and a New York trialjudge.)13 His attack is 
not strengthened by repeating it, especially with no examples to explain-or 
justify-his position. 
Page 473: ''The medical profession in Texas has come to take a serious 
interest in judicial politics for the purpose of influencing the development of 
9 Carrington & Long, supra note 1. at 2-35. 
\0 Id. at 472. 
II For those facts, see Schotland, supra note 8, at 1362 n.4. 
12 Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 472. 
13 Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in 
Highest State Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 102 (1998); Roy A. Schotland, 
Comment: Judicial Independence and Accountability 61 LAw &CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 151-52 
(1998). 
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malpractice law. What we have established in high court elections is interest 
group politics in its most unwelcome fonns."14 
That first sentence retreats from Carrington's statement submitted for the 
Symposium, which was: "I have been told that the most powerful force in 
Texas judicial politics at this time is the medical profession; that is plausible." 
Oi ven the following facts, query whether he retreats far enough. The total 
sum contributed to Texas judicial campaigns in the 1994, 1996, and 1998 
election cycles is $17,824,702 according to the National Institute on Money in 
Politics. IS Although the Institute has not yet completed analysis of those 
contributions, ofthe $12,568,685 (71 %) that it has analyzed, it found that the 
entire Health Sector -from doctors and their PACs, through nurses;hospitals, 
medical supplies manufacturers, etc.-- gave $461,697 or under 5%;16 The 
Institute believes it extremely unlikely that that proportion will change 
materially when the analysis is complete. 17 I am surprised that members of the 
Health Sector contributed so little, but even if the Institute's figure errs, the 
error would have to be massive to justify Carrington's original statement or his 
fudged implication. Again, he has hit and run with his comments, with no 
effort to substantiate. 
Page 474: "Often, lawyers or litigants who are likely to appear before the 
judge constitute large proportions of the contributions to judicial candidates."IS 
"Often" is then followed by two examples (attacking two Ohio Justices) and 
this generalization: "At best, campaign fundraising by judicial candidates is 
unseemly and degrading. At worst, it tempts those with an interest in a state's 
law to try to buy a high court."19 
One of the leading myths about judicial campaigns is that they are 
primarily funded by lawyers. The most recent source on judicial campaign 
finance found this: 
Often attorneys account for large proportions, often even over 
75%, of the contributions to judicial candidates; but it is also 
true that often attorneys' contributions total only a minor 
fraction. Given the diversity of our jurisdictions, of 
14 Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 472-73. 
15 Nat'l Inst. On Money in Politics, Money in Judicial Politics, paper submitted to the 
Chief Justices' Summit (Dec. 2(00) (unpublished paper on file with author). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 474. The original phrasing was: ''There is no 
one likely to contribute to such campaigns other than lawyers or litigants who are likely to 
appear .... " 
19 Id. 
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candidates and of campaigns, the lack of a general pattern is 
no surprise. 20 
493 
That source gave episodic data (which is all we had at that time) on thirteen 
States.21 
As for contributions by "litigants who are likely to appear," again, what is 
Carrington's b,~sis? We do know that even judicial campaigns rely to a 
varying but often huge extent on the usual diversity of contributors, from 
lawyers to friends, family, and often supporters drawn by links of party, 
ethnos, gender, and ideology.22 
Of course there are episodes of contributions by lawyers that are 
troublesome indeed, such as the following example, which involved one law 
firm, the Ohio Supreme Court, and a suit for damages against Conrail.23 
Plaintiffs' daughter had been killed by a train when she drove onto a grade 
crossing despite closed gates and flashing lights.24 The extensive proceedings 
in Ohio courts involved three trials: a jury trial for compensatory damages,2S a 
bench trial for punitive damages,26 and then after an appeal,27 a jury trial for 
punitive damages. Another appeal then followed,28 followed by a final appeal 
in the Ohio Supreme Court.29 That appeal was sought by both sides after the 
second jury had awarded punitive damages of $25,000,000, reduced by the 
trial judge to $15,000,000.30 
Plaintiff was represented by Murray & Murray Co., a farm that includes 
nine members of the Murray family. Before the Supreme Court agreed on 
February 18,1998 to hear that appeal,31 campaign contributions were made to 
two Associate Justices by that firm and by nine Murrays in the firm and seven 
Murray spOuses. Those contributions were made on February 9 to one Justice 
20 A.B.A. Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions, Report, Part Two, at 89-95 
(1998). 
21 ld. A recent study found that lawyers accounted for only twenty-eight percent of the 
total $53,128,350 contributed in 1989-99 supreme court elections in Alabama. Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin. See The Nat. Inst. on Money in State 
Politics, supra note 17. 
22 See Schotland. supra note 8. at 1365. 
23 See Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999). 
24 ld at 548. 
~ ldat549. 
26 ld. 
27 ld., referring to, Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp. 640 N.E.2d 1160. 1173 (1994). 
28 ld. at 550. 
29 ld. 
30 ld. 
31 Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp .• 690 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio 1998). 
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and to the other Justice between January 19 and January 21.32 Each 
contribution complied with the relevant legal limit on contributions, as did the 
aggregation of contributions--$25,000 to each Justice. Those Justices ran for 
reelection in November 1998, and, according to their post-election campaign 
finance reports,33 these contributions turned out to be 4.4% of one Justice's 
total, and 4.7% of the other's. The source of these contributions was, for each 
Justice, one of their largest. 
Both Justices participated in the oral argument on November 10,1998. 
Their campaign finance reports were filed a month later, and in January 1999, 
Conrail filed a motion seeking the recusal of each Justice.34 In October 1999, 
. without the Court or either of those Justices addressing that motion, the Court 
decided in favor of plaintiffs.3s Conrail subsequently made these facts its 
major basis for seeking certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but it was turned 
down.36 
There is another example from the Michigan Supreme Court elections in 
2000. As of September, Michigan's sixteenth biggest firm (Sommers, 
Schwartz, Silver and Schwartz, which includes leading personal injury 
lawyers) contributed more than $225,000 to the three Democratic candidatesY 
That constituted more than 20% of the total contributed to those candidates-
29% of one candidate's total, 19% for another, and just under 19% for one 
who was once a partner at that firm. 38 
We do of course have problems, even major ones. Facts and factual 
episodes can justify inferences and recommendations for action. However, 
unsupported assertions and facile inferences, such as Carrington's, are suspect. 
Page 480: "Sitting Justices on high courts have been sitting ducks for 
political adversaries willing to spend big bucks to drive them off the bench."39 
This is another unsubstantiated assertion. In the most recent elections, as 
previously noted, big-buck political adversaries failed in Ohio and Michigan, 
and lost a Chief Justice whom they were supporting in Mississippi. In 1996, 
32 See Committee to Elect Francis Sweeney. Pre-Primary Campaign Finance Report 
(April 23. 1998). available at http://www.state.oh.uslsos; Committee for Paul Pfeifer. Pre· 
Primary Campaign Finance Report (April 23. 1998). available at http://www.state.oh.uslsosl. 
33 See Committee to Elect Francis Sweeney. Post-General Campaign Finance Report 
(Dec. 11. 1998). available at http://www.state.oh.uslsosl; Committee for Paul Pfeifer. Post-
General Campaign Finance Report (Dec. 11. 1998). available at http://www.state.oh.uslsosl. 
34 Respondents Motion to Recuse. Wightman v. Conso\. Rail Corp .• Ohio St.3d 431 
(1999) (No. 97-2342). 
3S Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp .• 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999). 
36 Conso\. Rail Corp. V. Wightman. 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
37 Dawson Bell. Lawjirm Raises Cash. Eyebrows in Judicial Races. DElRolT PREss. 
Sept. 27. 2000. at 1 A. 
38 [d. 
39 Carrington & Long. supra note 1. at 480. 
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two Justices were denied retention: in Nebraska by the national organization 
supporting term limits, which spent an estimated $200,000,40 and in Tennessee 
by local partisans who spent roughly $25,00Q41. In California in 1998, Chief 
Justice George and Justice Chin were threatened with a campaign against their 
retention, which required them to raise funds- but the campaign never 
surfaced. 
From 1964-94, in ten States with retention elections, 3912 judges have 
faced elections, and only fifty (1 %) were defeated - twenty-eight of them in 
Illinois, the only State requiring more than a 50% vote forretention.42 We lack 
similarly complete data on contestable elections, but the picture there is 
similar. Carrington's alarm about "sitting ducks" is baseless hyperbole. 
Page 480: "So widely shared is the despair that a meeting of Chief Justices 
was held soon after the 2000 elections under the auspices of the National 
Center for State Courts." 43 . 
Another inaccurate hyperbole. The "Chief Justices' Summit" was initiated 
in November, 1999, by Texas Chief Justice Tom Phillips and me, to build 
support for the then-just-adopted campaign finance amendments to the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct for which we had worked in the 1997-98 ABA task 
force. The Summit was under the auspices of Phillips and Texas Senate 
President pro tern Rodney Ellis, with fmancial support from the Open Society 
Institute and The Joyce Foundation. In addition, the National Center gave staff 
support, as they regularly do for the Conference of Chief Justices. When we 
began work on the Summit, we did not know that the judicial elections in 2000 
(in, e.g., Ohio and Michigan) would be as dramatic and disturbing as they 
turned out to be. But even after those elections, there was determination, not 
despair. 
Page 485: "An idea under discussion in Ohio newspapers is a proposal for 
a substantial lengthening of terms of office. There is much to be said for that 
idea . . .. On the other hand . . . ."44 
Lengthening terms was the second of twenty recommendations in the Call 
To Action issued by the Chief Justices' Summit.45 
Would you waffle on the need to improve on the current scene, which is 
this: for all states' appellate judges, 58% have initial terms of six years or less, 
40 A.B.A. Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions, Report, Part Two. at 6. 
41 [d. 
42 Aspin & Hall, Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37 Soc. SCI. 
J. 1 (2000). 
43 Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 480. The original phrasing called this an 
"emergency" meeting. 
44 Id. at 485. 
45 Nat'l Summit on Improving Judicial Selection. Call To Action. 34 LoY. LA. LREv. 
1353, 1355 (2001). 
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and for subsequent terms, 45%.46 For all states' trial judges (general 
jurisdiction), 27% have initial terms of four years or less, and for subsequent 
terms, 18%, with another 56% having six-year terms.47 
Do you not believe that if Ohio changed from its current six -year tenns to, 
say, ten or even eight years, there would be substantial gains? The change 
would reduce campaign finance problems. More importantly, would not more 
fine lawyers be interested in seeking judgeships, and would not more fine 
judges want to stay on the bench? And is not the whole object of all efforts 
about judicial selection, to maintain and improve the caliber of who is on the 
bench? 
In summary, some of the errors noted above are minor, some not. 
However, they show a lack of care and a readiness to point with alarm-worse, 
a seeming eagerness to attack judges and others who are participating by the 
rules in the inherently difficult judicial election scene. The inferences and 
recommendations that Carrington adopts cannot be considered without taking 
into account the shakll:bss of their basis. 
Indeed, his major recommendation -"an official judicial voters' guide"--
includes not merely what he calls "imperfections," but ill-considered 
innovations.48 I not only share his enthusiasm for Voters' Guides, I've been 
pressing for them since 1985.49 For literally decades, Voters' Guides have 
been mailed to every registered voter in California, Oregon, Washington, 
Alaska, and, since 1990, New York City (though there only for city-wide 
candidates). The Guides are enormously popular in those jurisdictions as a 
favored or favorite source of information about candidates.so 
But Carrington's innovations are self-defeating. First, rather than charging 
candidates "a noticeable filing fee," entries are free or almost free in all 
jurisdictions, except some California counties. Instead of merely distributing 
at public libraries and courthouses and to requesters, the Guides are mailed to 
every registered voter in all jurisdictions. The recent Chief Justices' Summit 
urged state and local governments to copy this practice, and called on 
Congress to grant a freemailingprivilege.sl 
Second, even without official support, we can do better than the limited 
distribution Carrington suggests. In 1990, in North Carolina, a citizen 
committee initiated by the State Bar Association published 550,000 copies of a 
46 Schotland, supra note 13, at 152-55. 
47 [d. 
48 Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 483-85. 
49 Carrington refers only to voters' guides in the state of Washington, but Oregon, 
California and Alaska have used them since early in the 20th Century. See Roy A. Schotland, 
Elective Judges' Campaign FiflQllcing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperors' Clothes of 
American Democracy, 2 lL. & POL. 57.127-28 (1985). 
so [d. at 163-67. 
SI Nat'l Summit on Improving Judicial Selection. supra note 45, at 1357. 
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guide about that year's judicial candidates and distributed copies as stuffers in 
the leading Sunday newspapers (total cost was under $40,000).52 In 1996 and 
1998, in Washington State, that same mode of distribution was used for 1.2 
million guides for the primary election (because their primaries were not 
covered by the Secretary of State's Guide mailed to all voters, but the 
primaries detennine almost all of their judicial races), all pursuant to order by 
and funding from the Washington Supreme Court. As a result, in 2000, the 
Washington Secretary of State changed the State's long-standing practice, and 
published and mailed a Guide for the primaries. 
Third, why attach "certain conditions" to candidates' being able to give the 
voters brief information about themselves? "Rigorous requirement of publicity 
as to the source of [their campaign] funds" is already required in all states. To 
the extent that existing law may not suffice, the obvious step is corrective 
amendment. As for requiring agreement not to borrow money, that is not the 
law in any jurisdiction, federal or state, because any such limit would so favor 
incumbents, candidates with wealthy supporters, and wealthy self-funders. 
Finally, Carrington's proposed spOnSOr3 would conduct publicly-funded 
advertising "to rebut efforts of organizations to [sic] use 'soft money' to 
influence the results of the campaign. "54 Do you share my concern about the 
undesirability of, let alone the constitutional questions raised by, having the 
sponsor of an official publication run ads attacking candidates or interest 
groups? If this suggestion is coupled with Carrington's notion of charging the 
candidates, then to use their fees to fund intervention in their campaigns surely 
would add irony as well as more constitutional questions.ss 
52 I was privileged to participate in the initiation and operation of that North Carolina 
effort. One of the leaders was former Chief Justice Rhoda Billings; before and since her 
service on North Carolina's Supreme Court, she has served as a professor at Wake Forest U. 
School of Law. 
S3. "A not insoluble problem lies in the identity of a sufficiently neutral group to 
administer the system." Carrington & Long, supra note I, at 484. 
54 [d. The Original phrasing envisioned "a publicity campaign ... using spot ads and any 
other effective device ... to punish candidates and interest groups who depart from a 
democratically established morality of democratic campaig~ing." 
55 Of course there is a need to help the public evaluate no-holds-barred negative 
advertising in judicial campaigns, but the need is met best by non-official, diverse and 
representative citizens' groups. Columbus, Ohio has long benefited from such a group; more 
recently, so too have Cleveland and Youngstown. The Chief Justices' Summit urged 
establishment of such committees. As a result. in 2001 active efforts are under way in New 
York and Illinois. See Barbara Reed & Roy A. Schotland. Campaign Conduct Committees. 35 
IND. L. REv. 781 (2002). 
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I hope you will share his and my enthusiasm for voters' guides. Let us 
focus on the practices that have been successful so long for so many voters in 
five states. 56 
CONCLUSION 
The problems in judicial elections are too serious and too complex, 
ameliorative steps are too hard to design, and the status quo too hard to 
change, for us to allow unsubstantiated assertions and attacks that only make 
progress harder . 
.56 In addition to the four mentioned in note 49, Utah publishes and distributes widely 
an official voters' guide, but does not mail copies as do the other states. Since 1990, New York 
City also mails official voters' guides to all voters. 
